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Single Idea 12257

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism ]

Full Idea

Why not do away with talk of essences and replace it with talk of powers pure and simple, or reduce essences to collections of powers? But then what unites the powers, and could a power be lost, and is there entailment between the powers?

Gist of Idea

Could we replace essence with collections of powers?

Source

David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 6.3)

Book Ref

Oderberg,David S.: 'Real Essentialism' [Routledge 2009], p.142


A Reaction

[He cites Bennett and Hacker 2003 for this view] The point would seem to be that in addition to the powers, there are also identity and unity and kind-membership to be explained. Oderberg says the powers flow from the essence.


The 22 ideas from David S. Oderberg

Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg]
Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg]
Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg]
Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg]
The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg]
Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg]
The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg]
The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg]
Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG]
Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg]
Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg]
Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg]
What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg]
Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg]
'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg]
Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg]
Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg]
Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg]
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg]
Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg]