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Single Idea 15753

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism ]

Full Idea

A sophisticated Resemblance theory can appeal to the natures of the resembling things, from which the resemblances flow. The natures are suitably internal, but are as coarse as the things themselves (and perhaps are the things themselves).

Gist of Idea

Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined

Source

David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], 1)

Book Ref

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.164


A Reaction

Note that this is essentialism as an underpinning for Resemblance Nominalism. His objection is that he just can't believe in essences, because they are too 'coarse' - which I take to mean that we cannot distinguish the boundaries of an essence.


The 34 ideas with the same theme [reasons to deny the existence of 'essences']:

Is the being or essence of each thing private to each person? [Plato]
Substantial forms are not understood, and explain nothing [Descartes]
Essence is just an artificial word from logic, giving a way of thinking about substances [Hobbes]
There are no independent natural kinds - or our classifications have to be subjective [Locke, by Jolley]
We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one [Locke]
Leibniz was not an essentialist [Leibniz, by Wiggins]
The essence of a thing is only an opinion about the 'thing' [Nietzsche]
Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell]
Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine]
Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine]
Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine]
Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine]
Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody on Quine]
Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner]
Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam]
Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong]
The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists [Ellis]
There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity [Shoemaker]
Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson]
We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden]
Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R]
Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael]
Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N]
Critics say that essences are too mysterious to be known [Shalkowski]
Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg]
Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider]
That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle]
Essentialism is useful for predictions, but it is not the actual structure of reality [Gelman]
Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty]
Individual essences are just cobbled together classificatory predicates [Almog]