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Single Idea 11165

[filed under theme 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential ]

Full Idea

If there is nothing in the nature of Socrates which demands that he exists, then presumably there is nothing in the nature of Socrates which demands that his parents exist.

Gist of Idea

If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence

Source

Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 6)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophical Perspectives' [-], p.6


A Reaction

This sounds conclusive to me, against any claim that Socrates necessarily had those parents, if the claim is based on the identity or esssence of Socrates.


The 21 ideas from 'Essence and Modality'

Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami]
An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K]
Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K]
Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K]
Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K]
Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K]
Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K]
Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K]
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K]
Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K]
The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K]
Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K]