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Single Idea 17046

[filed under theme 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential ]

Full Idea

Could the Queen - could this woman herself - have been born of different parents from the parents from whom she actually came?

Gist of Idea

Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents?

Source

Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3)

Book Ref

Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.112

A Reaction

Tricky! No, because the past is fixed? Could the Queen have visited Russia when she was 20? I suppose so. Might she not have had parents, given who she is? I don't see why not. Could this desk have been made by someone else? Why not?

Related Idea

Idea 1792 He taught that there are two elements, fire the maker, and earth the matter [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]

The 137 ideas from Saul A. Kripke

10760 With possible worlds, S4 and S5 are sound and complete, but S1-S3 are not even sound [Kripke, by Rossberg]
10163 Propositional modal logic has been proved to be complete [Kripke, by Feferman/Feferman]
16189 The variable domain approach to quantified modal logic invalidates the Barcan Formula [Kripke, by Simchen]
15132 The Barcan formulas fail in models with varying domains [Kripke, by Williamson]
9172 A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
9171 The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
9173 We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke]
9174 It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke]
9175 We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
9176 Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
9177 Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke]
9178 Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke]
13975 Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) [Kripke, by Soames]
16394 Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke]
17874 Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog on Kripke]
5822 The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke]
7430 Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke]
7867 If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau]
3228 Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey]
8259 Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction [Kripke, by Lowe]
7761 Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Kripke, by Lycan]
7693 Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Kripke, by Jacquette]
5821 Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Kripke, by Putnam]
14068 If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard on Kripke]
10436 A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
4689 Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker [Kripke, by McGinn]
17504 Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference [Kripke, by Putnam]
6765 Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind [Kripke, by Bird]
8957 Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó]
10428 Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
14896 Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology [Kripke, by Ladyman/Ross]
17647 Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Kripke, by Putnam]
5450 For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
16955 Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
10437 Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
10559 Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds [Kripke, by Zalta]
16395 Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Kripke, by Stalnaker]
13967 Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames on Kripke]
13970 Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Kripke, by Soames]
4728 Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady]
2408 Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Kripke, by Chalmers]
11867 If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Kripke, by Wiggins]
12018 Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Kripke, by Forbes,G]
13971 Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames]
12100 An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt]
4797 Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke [Kripke, by Psillos]
11880 Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Kripke, by Mackie,P]
4953 We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world [Kripke]
16989 Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence [Kripke]
4947 A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be [Kripke]
4948 Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything [Kripke]
16988 Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [Kripke, by PG]
16986 That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke]
16991 No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke]
16992 Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe [Kripke]
16990 A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke]
9386 The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori [Kripke]
16993 If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon [Kripke]
16998 Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something [Kripke]
17001 A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties [Kripke]
4952 Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones [Kripke]
4955 Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning [Kripke]
4949 Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
4951 A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke]
16996 Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
16997 An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke]
16995 Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke]
17037 Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree [Kripke]
17031 A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke]
17034 Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail [Kripke]
17036 Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke]
17038 If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke]
17030 Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke]
17029 It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him [Kripke]
17035 We refer through the community, going back to the original referent [Kripke]
4958 Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent [Kripke]
17033 We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke]
17048 Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical [Kripke]
17056 Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names [Kripke]
4967 It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke]
5832 Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP]
4968 Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke]
4961 It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents [Kripke]
9387 The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth [Kripke]
17054 Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths [Kripke]
17057 Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds [Kripke]
4965 Science searches basic structures in search of essences [Kripke]
17050 Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them [Kripke]
17049 'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough [Kripke]
17051 The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances [Kripke]
4963 The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary [Kripke]
17053 Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold? [Kripke]
4964 'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth [Kripke]
17046 Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents? [Kripke]
4960 "'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori [Kripke]
4966 Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori [Kripke]
17055 Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke]
4959 A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke]
17047 If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke]
17045 De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke]
8274 Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe on Kripke]
14893 Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by Maciŕ/Garcia-Carpentiro]
17059 Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke]
17058 What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke]
4970 What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke]
9221 The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider]
4950 Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke]
16999 A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke]
17000 We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke]
17003 Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke]
4956 A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke]
17032 Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke]
17044 A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke]
11868 A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
17052 The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke]
4969 I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke]
16981 With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
4942 The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
16982 A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
9385 The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke]
4943 Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke]
16983 Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke]
16984 I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke]
16985 Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke]
15327 Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Kripke, by Horsten]
15343 Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Kripke, by Horsten]
14967 Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Kripke, by Gupta]
16328 Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Kripke, by Halbach]
14966 The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Kripke, by Gupta]
16383 Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
10792 The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)]
7305 Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A]
11075 The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna]
11076 Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna]
19270 If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke]
19269 'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke]
19271 No rule can be fully explained [Kripke]