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Single Idea 8274

[filed under theme 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential ]

Full Idea

Against Kripke's thesis of 'necessity of origin' I will just point out the intuitive force of the claim that Socrates - that very person - could, logically, have had no beginning to his existence at all, or have come into existence ex nihilo.

Gist of Idea

Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin'

Source

comment on Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], p.110-) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 6.5

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.152

A Reaction

It also strikes me that one base-pair difference in his DNA (by a mutation, or a fractionally different parent) would still leave him as Socrates. People are not good candidates for 'rigid' designation. Counterparts seems a better account here.

The 137 ideas from Saul A. Kripke

10760 With possible worlds, S4 and S5 are sound and complete, but S1-S3 are not even sound [Kripke, by Rossberg]
10163 Propositional modal logic has been proved to be complete [Kripke, by Feferman/Feferman]
16189 The variable domain approach to quantified modal logic invalidates the Barcan Formula [Kripke, by Simchen]
15132 The Barcan formulas fail in models with varying domains [Kripke, by Williamson]
9172 A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
9171 The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
9173 We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke]
9174 It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke]
9175 We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
9176 Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
9177 Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke]
9178 Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke]
13975 Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) [Kripke, by Soames]
16394 Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke]
17874 Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog on Kripke]
5822 The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke]
7430 Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke]
7867 If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau]
3228 Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey]
8259 Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction [Kripke, by Lowe]
7761 Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Kripke, by Lycan]
7693 Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Kripke, by Jacquette]
5821 Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Kripke, by Putnam]
14068 If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard on Kripke]
10436 A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
4689 Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker [Kripke, by McGinn]
17504 Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference [Kripke, by Putnam]
6765 Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind [Kripke, by Bird]
8957 Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó]
10428 Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
14896 Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology [Kripke, by Ladyman/Ross]
17647 Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Kripke, by Putnam]
5450 For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
16955 Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
10437 Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
10559 Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds [Kripke, by Zalta]
16395 Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Kripke, by Stalnaker]
13967 Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames on Kripke]
13970 Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Kripke, by Soames]
4728 Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady]
2408 Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Kripke, by Chalmers]
11867 If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Kripke, by Wiggins]
12018 Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Kripke, by Forbes,G]
13971 Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames]
12100 An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt]
4797 Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke [Kripke, by Psillos]
11880 Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Kripke, by Mackie,P]
4953 We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world [Kripke]
16989 Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence [Kripke]
4947 A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be [Kripke]
4948 Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything [Kripke]
16988 Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [Kripke, by PG]
16986 That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke]
16991 No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke]
16992 Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe [Kripke]
16990 A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke]
9386 The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori [Kripke]
16993 If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon [Kripke]
16998 Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something [Kripke]
17001 A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties [Kripke]
4952 Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones [Kripke]
4955 Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning [Kripke]
4949 Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
4951 A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke]
16996 Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
16997 An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke]
16995 Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke]
17037 Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree [Kripke]
17031 A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke]
17034 Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail [Kripke]
17036 Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke]
17038 If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke]
17030 Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke]
17029 It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him [Kripke]
17035 We refer through the community, going back to the original referent [Kripke]
4958 Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent [Kripke]
17033 We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke]
17048 Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical [Kripke]
17056 Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names [Kripke]
4967 It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke]
5832 Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP]
4968 Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke]
4961 It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents [Kripke]
9387 The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth [Kripke]
17054 Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths [Kripke]
17057 Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds [Kripke]
4965 Science searches basic structures in search of essences [Kripke]
17050 Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them [Kripke]
17049 'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough [Kripke]
17051 The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances [Kripke]
4963 The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary [Kripke]
17053 Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold? [Kripke]
4964 'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth [Kripke]
17046 Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents? [Kripke]
4960 "'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori [Kripke]
4966 Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori [Kripke]
17055 Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke]
4959 A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke]
17047 If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke]
17045 De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke]
8274 Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe on Kripke]
14893 Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by Maciŕ/Garcia-Carpentiro]
17059 Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke]
17058 What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke]
4970 What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke]
9221 The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider]
4950 Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke]
16999 A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke]
17000 We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke]
17003 Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke]
4956 A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke]
17032 Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke]
17044 A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke]
11868 A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
17052 The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke]
4969 I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke]
16981 With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
4942 The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
16982 A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
9385 The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke]
4943 Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke]
16983 Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke]
16984 I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke]
16985 Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke]
15327 Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Kripke, by Horsten]
15343 Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Kripke, by Horsten]
14967 Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Kripke, by Gupta]
16328 Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Kripke, by Halbach]
14966 The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Kripke, by Gupta]
16383 Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
10792 The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)]
7305 Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A]
11075 The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna]
11076 Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna]
19270 If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke]
19269 'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke]
19271 No rule can be fully explained [Kripke]