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Full Idea
For me, all the worlds are on an equal footing in that each is actual relative to itself and none is actual relative to any other.
Gist of Idea
For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself
Source
David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 3.1)
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.138
A Reaction
Lewis says the world we call 'actual' is simply a matter of how our indexicals refer. That sounds the wrong way round to me (as so often with Lewis).
| 15472 | It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB] |
| 5482 | Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals [Ellis] |
| 16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
| 12255 | For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis] |
| 9219 | Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider] |
| 15022 | If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis] |
| 10469 | A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis] |
| 16283 | For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis] |
| 12008 | Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G] |
| 12009 | The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G] |
| 4586 | You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil] |
| 10982 | How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read] |
| 12465 | Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs] |