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Single Idea 5482
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
]
Full Idea
The main trouble with possible worlds realism is that the only reason anyone has, or ever could have, to believe in other possible worlds (other than this one) is that they are needed, apparently, to provide truth conditions for modals and conditionals.
Clarification
'Realism' here is the belief that possible worlds actually exist. 'Modals' are possibilities and necessities.
Gist of Idea
Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals
Source
Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7)
Book Ref
Ellis,Brian: 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism' [Acumen 2002], p.129
A Reaction
This attacks Lewis. Ellis makes this sound like a trivial technicality, but if our metaphysics is going to make sense it must cover modals and conditionals. What do they actually mean? Lewis has a theory, at least.
The
41 ideas
from 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism'
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5443
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Kripke and others have made essentialism once again respectable
[Ellis]
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5442
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For 'passivists' behaviour is imposed on things from outside
[Ellis]
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5445
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Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents
[Ellis]
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5446
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For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical
[Ellis]
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5444
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'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to
[Ellis]
|
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5448
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'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way
[Ellis]
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5447
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Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things
[Ellis]
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5462
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Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate
[Ellis]
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5458
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Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional
[Ellis]
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5456
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Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent
[Ellis]
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5453
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Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction
[Ellis]
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5457
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Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications
[Ellis, by PG]
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5460
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Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once
[Ellis]
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5459
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Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws
[Ellis]
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5461
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The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell
[Ellis]
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5464
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For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds
[Ellis]
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5463
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Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances
[Ellis]
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5466
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Primary qualities are number, figure, size, texture, motion, configuration, impenetrability and (?) mass
[Ellis]
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5468
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Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures)
[Ellis, by PG]
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5469
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The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions
[Ellis]
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5471
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Essentialism says natural kinds are fundamental to nature, and determine the laws
[Ellis]
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5472
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Natural kinds are of objects/substances, or events/processes, or intrinsic natures
[Ellis]
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5473
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The laws of nature imitate the hierarchy of natural kinds
[Ellis]
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5474
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Laws of nature tend to describe ideal things, or ideal circumstances
[Ellis]
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5475
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We must explain the necessity, idealisation, ontology and structure of natural laws
[Ellis]
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5480
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The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws
[Ellis]
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5478
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Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility
[Ellis]
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5476
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Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori
[Ellis]
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5477
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One thing can look like something else, without being the something else
[Ellis]
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5479
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Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible
[Ellis]
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5483
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Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world
[Ellis]
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5482
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Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals
[Ellis]
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5481
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Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects
[Ellis]
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5486
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Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language
[Ellis]
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5485
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Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue
[Ellis]
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5484
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Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour
[Ellis]
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5488
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Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency
[Ellis]
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5489
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Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions
[Ellis]
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5490
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Essentialism fits in with Darwinism, but not with extreme politics of left or right
[Ellis]
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5491
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A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved
[Ellis]
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5487
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Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology
[Ellis]
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