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Single Idea 15690

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure ]

Full Idea

Properties that enter into causally meaningful links are better remembered and are treated as more central to the category than properties that are not causally meaningful.

Gist of Idea

Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts

Source

Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 05 'Causation2')

Book Ref

Gelman,Susan A.: 'The Essential Child' [OUP 2005], p.116

A Reaction

This is a summary of considerable psychological research. This account not only sounds plausible, but would fit better withy why we form concepts and categories in the first place. We are trying to relate to the causations of nature.

The 32 ideas from Susan A. Gelman

15685 Essentialism is either natural to us, or an accident of our culture, or a necessary result of language [Gelman]
15679 Essentialism comes from the cognitive need to categorise [Gelman]
15678 Essentialism says categories have a true hidden nature which gives an object its identity [Gelman]
15683 Sortals are needed for determining essence - the thing must be categorised first [Gelman]
15684 Children's concepts include nonobvious features, like internal parts, functions and causes [Gelman]
15681 Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman]
15682 Even fairly simple animals make judgements based on categories [Gelman]
15680 Folk essentialism rests on belief in natural kinds, in hidden properties, and on words indicating structures [Gelman]
15686 Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman]
15687 Kinship is essence that comes in degrees, and age groups are essences that change over time [Gelman]
15688 Categories are characterized by distance from a prototype [Gelman]
15689 Theory-based concepts use rich models to show which similarities really matter [Gelman]
15690 Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman]
15697 Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories [Gelman]
15696 Peope favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is [Gelman]
15691 Children accept real stable categories, with nonobvious potential that gives causal explanations [Gelman]
15692 People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman]
15694 Children overestimate the power of a single example [Gelman]
15695 Children make errors in induction by focusing too much on categories [Gelman]
15693 One sample of gold is enough, but one tree doesn't give the height of trees [Gelman]
15698 We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children [Gelman]
15700 In India, upper-castes essentialize caste more than lower-castes do [Gelman]
15699 Prelinguistic infants acquire and use many categories [Gelman]
15701 Nouns seem to invoke stable kinds more than predicates do [Gelman]
15702 Essentialism doesn't mean we know the essences [Gelman]
15703 Memories often conform to a theory, rather than being neutral [Gelman]
15704 Essentialism starts from richly structured categories, leading to a search for underlying properties [Gelman]
15708 Inductive success is rewarded with more induction [Gelman]
15707 There is intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist and deontological understanding [Gelman]
15709 Essentialism is useful for predictions, but it is not the actual structure of reality [Gelman]
15705 Essentialism encourages us to think about the world scientifically [Gelman]
15706 A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman]