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Single Idea 18584

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure ]

Full Idea

One hybrid theory of concepts says they have both a core and an identification procedure. The core is a definition (necessary and sufficient conditions), while the identification procedure consists of a prototype (the properties typical of a category).

Gist of Idea

One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification

Source

Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 3.3.1)

Book Ref

Machery,Edouard: 'Doing Without Concepts' [OUP 2009], p.65

A Reaction

This combines the classical and prototype theories of concepts. I like it because it fits the idea of 'mental files' nicely (see Recanati). If concepts are files (as in a database) they will have aspects like labels, basic info, and further details.

The 51 ideas from Edouard Machery

18563 By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery]
18557 Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery]
18559 Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact [Machery]
18558 Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery]
18562 Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes [Machery]
18561 We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery]
18560 Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery]
18564 Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals? [Machery]
18565 There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip [Machery]
18566 Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery]
18567 In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery]
18569 In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery]
18570 There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts [Machery]
18573 For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts [Machery]
18574 Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery]
18575 The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery]
18584 One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery]
18585 Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery]
18577 The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery]
18587 The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery]
18578 Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery]
18588 Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery]
18589 For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery]
18590 Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery]
18591 Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery]
18592 The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery]
18583 Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery]
18594 Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery]
18593 The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery]
18595 Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery]
18596 Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery]
18597 Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery]
18598 Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery]
18599 In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery]
18600 Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery]
18601 Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery]
18602 A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws [Machery]
18603 Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery]
18604 Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different? [Machery]
18605 It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery]
18606 The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery]
18607 Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery]
18608 If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery]
18609 Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another [Machery]
18610 'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them [Machery]
18611 We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery]
18612 Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery]
18613 Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry [Machery]
18615 Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery]
18616 If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery]
18614 Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery]