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Full Idea
For Frege, concepts differ from objects in being inherently incomplete in nature.
Gist of Idea
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete
Source
report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2
Book Ref
George,A/Velleman D.J.: 'Philosophies of Mathematics' [Blackwell 2002], p.20
A Reaction
This is because they are 'unsaturated', needing a quantified variable to complete the sentence. This could be a pointer towards Quine's view of properties, as simply an intrinsic feature of predication about objects, with no separate identity.
| 18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
| 18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
| 4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
| 9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
| 4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
| 8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
| 8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
| 8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
| 8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
| 8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |
| 8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |