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Full Idea
For Frege, concepts differ from objects in being inherently incomplete in nature.
Gist of Idea
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete
Source
report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2
Book Ref
George,A/Velleman D.J.: 'Philosophies of Mathematics' [Blackwell 2002], p.20
A Reaction
This is because they are 'unsaturated', needing a quantified variable to complete the sentence. This could be a pointer towards Quine's view of properties, as simply an intrinsic feature of predication about objects, with no separate identity.
| 9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
| 12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
| 15690 | Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman] |
| 11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 18566 | Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery] |
| 18584 | One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery] |
| 18585 | Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery] |
| 18578 | Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery] |