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Single Idea 11144

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language ]

Full Idea

A private attitude is not intelligible except as an adjustment to the public norms provided by language. It follows that a creature must be a member of speech community if it is to have the concept of belief.

Gist of Idea

Concepts are only possible in a language community

Source

Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.170)

Book Ref

Davidson,Donald: 'Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (2nd ed)' [OUP 2001], p.170

A Reaction

This obviously draws on Wittgenstein's private language argument, and strikes me as blatantly wrong, because I take higher animals to have concepts without language. Pure vision gives rise to concepts. I don't even think they are necessarily conscious.

The 159 ideas from Donald Davidson

7949 Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
3395 Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]
20020 If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20072 We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
23734 The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
23737 Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
20075 Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
6664 Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
20045 Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
10371 Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
8403 Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson]
4778 A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos]
8346 Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
8348 If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson]
8347 Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson]
8349 The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson]
19081 Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan]
8255 Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson]
18703 Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button]
8252 Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell]
8801 Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
8802 Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
8804 Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]
8805 Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson]
8806 The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson]
19044 Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson]
6398 Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson]
6399 Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson]
6400 Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson]
7331 A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey]
8872 It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson]
8873 The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson]
8874 It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson]
23294 It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]
23296 We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson]
23295 Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson]
23297 The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson]
23298 Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson]
19698 Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta]
9843 You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson]
18914 Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen]
8278 The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson]
14602 Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
14004 We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne]
20024 Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20076 An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson]
6384 The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson]
6383 Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson]
6385 The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson]
6175 External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands]
7771 We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan]
15002 If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider]
8860 Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson]
6386 In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson]
3429 Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim]
3529 Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin]
2307 Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim]
5497 Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
4081 Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane]
2321 If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
3404 Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
3405 If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
6620 Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
3524 Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin]
3526 Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin]
16041 Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
4983 There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]
7775 Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson]
7776 Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson]
7777 We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson]
4041 Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson]
4042 Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson]
3960 There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
3961 Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
3964 If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
3965 Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
3966 The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
3963 There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
3962 Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]
3968 Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
3967 Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
3969 There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
3972 Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
3970 Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
3971 There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
3973 Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
3974 Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
20074 We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R]
6387 A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson]
6388 Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson]
6389 To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson]
6390 With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson]
6391 A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson]
18702 Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson]
15160 Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames]
14612 Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart]
18902 Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson]
6394 The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson]
6395 An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson]
11144 Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson]
11145 Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson]
6396 A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson]
6397 The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson]
6392 Thought depends on speech [Davidson]
6393 A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson]
10347 Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson]
10346 Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett]
8866 If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson]
8867 A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson]
8868 Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson]
8869 The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson]
8870 Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson]
8188 Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences [Davidson, by Dummett]
6179 Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson]
7327 Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
7769 You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan]
7772 Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan]
7332 There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson]
19133 If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson]
19132 Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson]
19131 We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson]
19136 Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson]
19139 Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson]
19147 Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson]
19151 Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson]
19150 Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson]
19146 Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]
19145 We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson]
19144 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson]
19148 There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson]
19142 Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson]
19140 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson]
19149 If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson]
19152 Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson]
19154 The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson]
19153 Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson]
19156 Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson]
19158 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson]
19161 We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson]
19162 Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson]
19163 You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson]
19167 Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson]
19166 The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson]
19160 A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson]
19170 Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson]
19174 Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson]
19172 To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson]
19173 Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson]
19176 The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson]
19169 Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson]
23287 Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson]
23288 When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson]
23289 Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson]
23290 It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson]
23291 Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson]
23292 Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson]
23284 Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson]
23285 If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson]
23286 Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson]