more on this theme     |     more from this text

Single Idea 12592

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language ]

Full Idea

Concepts and other aspects of mental representation have content but not (normally) meaning (unless they are also expressions in a language used in communication).

Gist of Idea

Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication

Source

Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.1.2)

Book Ref

Harman,Gilbert: 'Reasoning Meaning and Mind' [OUP 1999], p.208

A Reaction

Given his account of meaning as involving some complex 'role', he has to say this, though it seems a dubious distinction, going against the grain of a normal request to ask what some concept 'means'. What is 'democracy'?

The 70 ideas from Gilbert Harman

19304 The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
19303 Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
19305 The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman]
19308 We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman]
19306 It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
19307 If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
19309 Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
19310 High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman]
19311 In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
19312 Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
12588 Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman]
12589 Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman]
12590 Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman]
12592 Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman]
12591 Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman]
12593 The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman]
12594 If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman]
12596 Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman]
12595 We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman]
12597 I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman]
12598 Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman]
12599 Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman]
12600 The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman]
12601 The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman]
12602 There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman]
12603 We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman]
5120 What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values [Harman]
5121 Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman]
8800 If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects [Harman, by Sosa]
17060 Best Explanation is the core notion of epistemology [Harman, by Smart]
8130 Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge]
5122 Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it [Harman]
5123 Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it [Harman]
5124 If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait [Harman]
5125 Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character [Harman]
6950 You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman]
6951 Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman]
6952 Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman]
6953 All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman]
6955 Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman]
6954 A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman]
6369 In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz]
3073 We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman]
3074 People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman]
3075 Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman]
3076 Defining dispositions is circular [Harman]
3077 Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman]
3078 Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman]
3079 Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman]
3081 A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman]
3080 Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman]
3082 Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman]
3083 Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman]
3084 Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman]
3085 Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman]
3087 The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman]
3086 Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman]
3088 Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman]
3089 Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman]
3090 There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman]
3092 If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman]
3093 Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman]
3094 You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman]
3095 Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman]
3097 We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman]
3096 Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman]
3098 Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman]
3099 Inference is never a conscious process [Harman]
3101 Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman]
3100 You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman]