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Single Idea 12575
[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
]
Full Idea
Evans's 'Generality Constraint' says that if a thinker is capable of attitudes to the content Fa and possesses the singular concept b, then he is capable of having attitudes to the content Fb.
Gist of Idea
Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them
Source
report of Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980], 4.3) by Christopher Peacocke - A Study of Concepts 1.1
Book Ref
Peacocke,Christopher: 'A Study of Concepts' [MIT 1999], p.1
A Reaction
So having an attitude becomes the test of whether one possesses a concept. I suppose if one says 'You know you've got a concept when you are capable of thinking about it', that is much the same thing. Sounds fine.
The
23 ideas
from Gareth Evans
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9041
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The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation
[Evans]
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9038
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We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes
[Evans]
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5823
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The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it
[Evans]
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9039
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If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit
[Evans]
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9040
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Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs
[Evans]
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9043
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We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people
[Evans]
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5825
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Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information
[Evans]
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5824
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How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation?
[Evans]
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9042
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A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public
[Evans]
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7639
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The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally
[Evans]
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14895
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'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification
[Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
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11881
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Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty
[Evans, by Mackie,P]
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16129
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Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague
[Evans, by Lowe]
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16459
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Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries?
[Evans]
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16457
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There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion
[Evans, by Lewis]
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16460
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Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right
[Evans, by Lewis]
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14484
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If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity
[Evans, by Thomasson]
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16224
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There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b
[Evans, by PG]
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12580
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Experiences have no conceptual content
[Evans, by Greco]
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23794
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Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual
[Evans, by Schulte]
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12575
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Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them
[Evans, by Peacocke]
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7643
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We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour
[Evans]
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16366
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The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything
[Evans]
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