more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 2438
[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
]
Full Idea
Semantics, according to the informational view, is mostly about counterfactuals; what counts for the identity of my concepts is not what I do distinguish but what I could distinguish if I cared to (even using instruments and experts).
Gist of Idea
In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.I)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'The Elm and the Expert' [MIT 1995], p.37
A Reaction
We all differ in our discriminations (and awareness of expertise), so our concepts would differ, which is bad news for communication (see Idea 223). The view has some plausibility, though.
Related Idea
Idea 223
If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
The
30 ideas
from 'The Elm and the Expert'
|
2432
|
Is content basically information, fixed externally?
[Fodor]
|
|
2433
|
For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning
[Fodor]
|
|
2434
|
Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation
[Fodor]
|
|
2436
|
It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth)
[Fodor]
|
|
2435
|
Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving
[Fodor]
|
|
2437
|
XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility
[Fodor]
|
|
2438
|
In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions
[Fodor]
|
|
2439
|
Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences
[Fodor]
|
|
2441
|
Truth conditions require a broad concept of content
[Fodor]
|
|
2440
|
Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way
[Fodor]
|
|
2442
|
Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world
[Fodor]
|
|
2461
|
An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time
[Fodor]
|
|
2459
|
Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is
[Fodor]
|
|
2446
|
Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle
[Fodor]
|
|
2450
|
Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment
[Fodor]
|
|
2463
|
A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality
[Fodor]
|
|
2447
|
Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind
[Fodor]
|
|
2462
|
Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs
[Fodor]
|
|
2458
|
Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs
[Fodor]
|
|
2460
|
Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean
[Fodor]
|
|
2454
|
We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments
[Fodor]
|
|
2455
|
Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused
[Fodor]
|
|
2443
|
I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation
[Fodor]
|
|
2453
|
We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts
[Fodor]
|
|
2445
|
Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again
[Fodor]
|
|
2452
|
Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content
[Fodor]
|
|
2457
|
If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs
[Fodor]
|
|
2451
|
To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true
[Fodor]
|
|
2464
|
Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds
[Fodor]
|
|
3114
|
Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff
[Fodor]
|