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Single Idea 11129
[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
]
Full Idea
The appeal of the classical theory of concepts is that it offers unified treatments of concept acquisition (assembling constituents), categorization (check constituents against target), and reference determination (whether they apply).
Gist of Idea
The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference
Source
E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.1)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.7
A Reaction
[See Idea 11128 for the theory] As so often, I find myself in sympathy with the traditional view which has been relegated to ignominy by our wonderful modern philosophers.
Related Idea
Idea 11128
Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence]
The
23 ideas
from 'Concepts'
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11120
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Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11121
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Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11122
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A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11124
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Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11123
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Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11125
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The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11128
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Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11129
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The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11130
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Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11131
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It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11134
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People don't just categorise by apparent similarities
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11136
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Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11133
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Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11135
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Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11132
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The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11137
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The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11138
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The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts?
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11139
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Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11140
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Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11141
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Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11142
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Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11146
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People can formulate new concepts which are only named later
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11147
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Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition
[Margolis/Laurence]
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