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Single Idea 11131

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts ]

Full Idea

In the light of problems such as the definition of knowledge, many philosophers now take seriously the possibility that our concepts lack definitional structure.

Gist of Idea

It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure

Source

E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.1)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.8

A Reaction

This challenges the classical view, that there are precise conditions for each concept. That view would obviously be in difficulties with atomic concepts, so our account of those might be applied all the way up.

The 14 ideas with the same theme [concepts as necessary and sufficient conditions of groups]:

6985 Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson]
17706 The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares]
17969 The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy]
17970 Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy]
17971 Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy]
17972 The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy]
17973 The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy]
11128 Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence]
11129 The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence]
11130 Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence]
11131 It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence]
18590 Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery]
18591 Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery]
18583 Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery]