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Single Idea 12155

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity ]

Full Idea

Statements of 'relative' identity are not identity statements at all, but what I would prefer to call 'statements of resemblance' or 'common property staztements'.

Gist of Idea

Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance

Source

John Perry (The Same F [1970], n12)

Book Ref

'Metaphysics - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 1999], p.99

A Reaction

This seems like a neat way to sweep the problem from our sight. There remains a nervous metaphysical problem, though, because something seems to be identical when we spot a resemblance. Even two shades of red have something identical in them.

The 18 ideas with the same theme [identity can only ever be in respect of some feature]:

16794 As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes]
16795 Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke]
12153 Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege]
17653 Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
16075 Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
12152 Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
13953 An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
12155 Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry]
14362 Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
11838 Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins]
11847 To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins]
14755 Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
8305 A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe]
10321 We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale]
15185 We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle]
4640 If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG]
16074 Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]