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Single Idea 16075

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity ]

Full Idea

Geach's denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory. He must deny the axiom of extensionality in set theory, for example.

Gist of Idea

Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory

Source

comment on Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 6

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.17


A Reaction

I'm beginning to think we have two entirely different concepts here - the logicians' and mathematicians' notion of when two things are identical, and the ordinary language concept of two things being 'the same'. 'We like the same music'.


The 5 ideas from 'Reference and Generality (3rd ed)'

Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry]
We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne]
Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman]
Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]