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Single Idea 15475

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity ]

Full Idea

We must avoid a use of 'identity' that implies that any entity over time must be said to lack continuing identity simply because it has changed properties or has lost, added, or had substituted some parts.

Gist of Idea

The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts

Source

C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.3)

Book Ref

Martin,C.B.: 'The Mind in Nature' [OUP 2008], p.38

A Reaction

This may the key area where the logical-mathematical type of philosophy comes into contact with the natural-metaphysical type. Imagine Martin's concept of 'identity' in mathematics. π changes to 3.1387... during the calculation!

The 28 ideas from 'The Mind in Nature'

15465 Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB]
15466 'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers [Martin,CB]
15467 Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis [Martin,CB]
15468 Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB]
15469 Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB]
15470 Causal laws are summaries of powers [Martin,CB]
15471 Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB]
15472 It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB]
15474 Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB]
15475 The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB]
15476 Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB]
15481 I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB]
15479 Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB]
15484 A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality [Martin,CB]
15478 Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB]
15483 Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB]
15480 Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things) [Martin,CB]
15477 Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions [Martin,CB]
15482 We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum [Martin,CB]
15485 Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB]
15486 Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB]
15487 If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB]
15488 Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB]
15489 A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all [Martin,CB]
15491 Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB]
15492 Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative [Martin,CB]
15493 Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered [Martin,CB]
15495 Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB]