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Full Idea
The concept of identity is central in specifying spatio-temporally broad objects by ostension. Without identity, n acts of ostension merely specify up to n objects. ..But when we affirm identity of object between ostensions, they refer to the same object.
Gist of Idea
To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed
Source
Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 1)
Book Ref
Quine,Willard: 'From a Logical Point of View' [Harper and Row 1963], p.68
A Reaction
Quine says that there is an induction involved. On the whole, Quine seems to give a better account of identity than Geach or Wiggins can offer.
| 11092 | A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine] |
| 17595 | To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine] |
| 11095 | We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine] |
| 11093 | We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine] |
| 11096 | Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine] |
| 11094 | 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine] |
| 11097 | Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine] |
| 11101 | General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine] |
| 11099 | Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine] |
| 11103 | We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine] |
| 11104 | Concepts are language [Quine] |
| 11102 | Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine] |