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Single Idea 6058
[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
]
Full Idea
Identity propositions are not always analytic or a priori (as Frege long ago taught us) so there is nothing trivial about such propositions; the claim of redundancy ignores the epistemic role that the concept of identity plays.
Gist of Idea
Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role
Source
Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1)
Book Ref
McGinn,Colin: 'Logical Properties' [OUP 2003], p.13
A Reaction
He is referring to Frege's Morning Star/Evening Star distinction (Idea 4972). Wittgenstein wanted to eliminate our basic metaphysics by relabelling it as analytic or tautological, but his project failed. Long live metaphysics!
Related Idea
Idea 4972
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
The
40 ideas
from 'Logical Properties'
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6042
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The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool
[McGinn]
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6051
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In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements
[McGinn]
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6055
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Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation
[McGinn]
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6059
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Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation
[McGinn]
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6053
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Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be
[McGinn]
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6052
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Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity
[McGinn]
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6043
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Type-identity is close similarity in qualities
[McGinn]
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6044
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Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties
[McGinn]
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6046
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Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved
[McGinn]
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6058
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Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role
[McGinn]
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6054
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Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical
[McGinn]
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6050
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Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity
[McGinn]
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6049
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Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py'
[McGinn]
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6045
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It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance'
[McGinn]
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6047
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All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true
[McGinn]
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6048
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Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity
[McGinn]
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6071
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Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances
[McGinn]
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6072
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If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence
[McGinn]
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6073
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I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined
[McGinn]
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6066
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Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects
[McGinn]
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6062
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Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence
[McGinn]
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6065
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We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties
[McGinn]
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6067
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Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists'
[McGinn]
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6069
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'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied
[McGinn]
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6068
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We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition
[McGinn]
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6064
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Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation
[McGinn]
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6070
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Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality
[McGinn]
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6075
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Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property
[McGinn]
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6074
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Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning?
[McGinn]
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6077
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Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects
[McGinn]
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6080
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Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties
[McGinn]
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6079
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If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds
[McGinn]
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6082
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If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities
[McGinn]
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6081
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Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge
[McGinn]
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6088
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Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions
[McGinn]
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6083
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The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs
[McGinn]
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6084
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'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall
[McGinn]
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6085
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The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence
[McGinn]
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6086
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Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts
[McGinn]
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6087
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Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony
[McGinn]
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