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Single Idea 12054

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind ]

Full Idea

A system of secondary substances with a claim to separate reality into its genuine primary substances must arise from an understanding of a set of principles of activity on the basis of which identities can be glossed in terms of determinate relations.

Gist of Idea

Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations

Source

David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.5.1)

Book Ref

'Philosophy: a Guide Through the Subject', ed/tr. Grayling,A.C. [OUP 1995], p.222

A Reaction

I translate this as saying that individual essences are categorised according to principles which explain behaviour and relations. I'm increasingly bewildered by the 'secondary substances' Wiggins got from 'Categories', and loves so much.

The 83 ideas from David Wiggins

13128 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
14746 What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins]
11900 We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins]
11896 A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
15835 Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
10679 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack]
14363 Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
14364 A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
14744 Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider]
14749 Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider]
14362 Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
11831 The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
11832 We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins]
11836 We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins]
11838 Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins]
11839 Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins]
11847 To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins]
11848 Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins]
11843 Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins]
11841 The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins]
11850 Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins]
11844 If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins]
11851 Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins]
11852 Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins]
11845 Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
11858 The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins]
11859 The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins]
11860 Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins]
11869 Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins]
11870 Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins]
11863 (λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins]
11861 We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins]
11864 Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins]
11865 The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins]
11866 The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins]
11871 Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins]
11875 Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins]
11876 It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins]
11879 Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
11835 The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins]
16492 Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins]
16493 Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins]
16495 The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins]
16496 Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins]
16494 We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins]
17529 Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins]
16497 Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins]
16498 Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins]
16499 A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins]
16502 Identity is primitive [Wiggins]
16503 'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins]
16501 In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins]
16505 By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins]
16506 Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins]
17530 The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins]
16510 Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins]
16509 Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins]
16511 A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins]
16512 Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins]
16514 Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins]
16515 A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins]
16517 Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins]
16518 We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins]
16521 A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins]
16522 It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins]
16523 Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins]
16524 Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins]
16525 Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience [Wiggins]
16526 Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. [Wiggins]
12057 Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins]
12047 We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins]
12056 An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect [Wiggins]
12055 Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins]
12059 A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins]
12063 Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins]
12064 The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology [Wiggins]
12065 Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation [Wiggins]
12049 Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information [Wiggins]
12050 Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins]
12052 We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins]
12051 If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins]
12053 'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins]
12054 Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins]