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Single Idea 12055

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind ]

Full Idea

Predications which answer the question 'what is x?' are often called 'sortal predications' in present-day philosophy.

Gist of Idea

Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?'

Source

David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.10.1)

Book Ref

'Philosophy: a Guide Through the Subject', ed/tr. Grayling,A.C. [OUP 1995], p.230

A Reaction

The word 'sortal' comes from Locke. Wiggins is the guru of 'sortal essentialism'. I just can't believe that in answer to the question 'what really is David Wiggins?' that he would be happy with a sequence of categorisations.

The 83 ideas from David Wiggins

13128 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
14746 What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins]
11900 We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins]
11896 A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
15835 Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
10679 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack]
14363 Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
14364 A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
14744 Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider]
14749 Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider]
14362 Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
11831 The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
11832 We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins]
11836 We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins]
11838 Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins]
11839 Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins]
11847 To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins]
11848 Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins]
11843 Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins]
11841 The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins]
11850 Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins]
11844 If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins]
11851 Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins]
11852 Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins]
11845 Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
11858 The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins]
11859 The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins]
11860 Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins]
11869 Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins]
11870 Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins]
11863 (λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins]
11861 We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins]
11864 Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins]
11865 The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins]
11866 The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins]
11871 Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins]
11875 Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins]
11876 It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins]
11879 Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
11835 The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins]
16492 Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins]
16493 Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins]
16495 The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins]
16496 Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins]
16494 We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins]
17529 Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins]
16497 Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins]
16498 Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins]
16499 A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins]
16502 Identity is primitive [Wiggins]
16503 'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins]
16501 In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins]
16505 By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins]
16506 Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins]
17530 The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins]
16510 Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins]
16509 Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins]
16511 A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins]
16512 Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins]
16514 Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins]
16515 A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins]
16517 Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins]
16518 We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins]
16521 A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins]
16522 It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins]
16523 Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins]
16524 Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins]
16525 Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience [Wiggins]
16526 Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. [Wiggins]
12057 Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins]
12047 We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins]
12056 An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect [Wiggins]
12055 Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins]
12059 A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins]
12063 Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins]
12064 The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology [Wiggins]
12065 Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation [Wiggins]
12049 Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information [Wiggins]
12050 Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins]
12052 We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins]
12051 If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins]
12053 'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins]
12054 Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins]