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Single Idea 15441

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object ]

Full Idea

What is wrong with the pictorial conception is that if the structural universal 'methane' is to be an isomorph of the molecules that are its instances, it must have the universal 'hydrogen' as a part not just once, but four times over.

Clarification

Methane is CH4

Gist of Idea

The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over

Source

David Lewis (Against Structural Universals [1986], 'The pictorial')

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.91


A Reaction

The point is that if hydrogen is a universal it must be unique, so there can't be four of them. To me this smacks of the hopeless mess theologians get into, because of bad premisses. Drop universals, and avoid this kind of stuff.

Related Idea

Idea 15439 The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]


The 17 ideas from 'Against Structural Universals'

Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis]
Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis]
I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis]
We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]