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Single Idea 12976

[filed under theme 2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition ]

Full Idea

The result of having an imperfect idea of something is that the same subject admits of several mutually independent definitions: we shall sometimes be unable to derive one from another, or see in advance that they must belong to a single subject.

Gist of Idea

If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.31)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'New Essays on Human Understanding', ed/tr. Remnant/Bennett [CUP 1996], p.267

A Reaction

See Idea 12975 for imperfect ideas of things. Obviously the idea is that perfect knowledge will converge on a single definition, which will pinpoint the essence of a thing, and then all explanations will flow. A nice addition to the Aristotelian view.

Related Idea

Idea 12975 We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz]

The 106 ideas from 'New Essays on Human Understanding'

5056 Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz]
5057 If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz]
5055 No two things are totally identical [Leibniz]
5053 The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz]
5054 Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz]
5058 Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz]
11855 Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz]
11856 Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz]
12931 Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz]
17079 Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz]
12929 All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz]
12933 Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz]
4302 You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz]
12930 The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz]
12932 The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz]
19360 General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz]
12937 We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz]
12935 Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz]
12934 We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz]
12936 There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz]
12942 Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz]
12938 An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz]
12945 Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz]
12944 It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz]
12941 There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz]
12939 Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz]
12940 What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz]
12943 Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz]
12946 The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz]
12947 We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz]
19357 The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz]
19358 Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz]
12948 A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz]
12950 We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz]
12949 Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz]
12951 Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz]
12952 Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz]
12953 Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz]
12956 Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz]
12955 If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz]
12954 God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz]
12958 Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz]
12957 The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz]
12962 Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz]
12964 If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz]
19364 Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz]
19368 The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz]
12959 We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz]
12965 All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz]
12963 Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz]
12960 We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz]
19328 Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz]
12966 Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz]
12967 I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz]
12969 The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz]
12968 A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz]
12970 We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz]
12972 Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz]
12971 If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz]
13098 We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz]
13075 No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz]
12973 We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz]
12884 The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz]
12974 People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz]
12976 If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz]
12978 A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz]
12975 We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz]
12977 We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz]
12981 Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz]
12984 Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz]
12983 A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz]
12980 Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz]
12982 One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz]
12979 The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz]
12985 Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz]
12986 The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz]
12987 For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz]
12989 Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz]
12988 The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz]
12990 Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz]
12992 Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz]
12993 Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz]
12991 Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz]
12994 Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz]
12995 The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz]
12811 We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz]
12998 Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz]
12996 I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz]
12997 Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz]
12999 Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz]
13000 Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz]
13002 It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz]
13001 Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz]
13003 The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz]
13006 Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz]
13005 Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz]
10056 At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz]
13008 Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz]
13009 A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz]
12805 If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz]
12806 Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley]
12808 Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz]
12807 The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz]
1414 A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz]
21252 Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz]
21253 Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz]