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Single Idea 13081

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity ]

Full Idea

It might be suggested that even the extreme modal realist can countenance transworld identity for abstract objects.

Gist of Idea

Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects

Source

Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 3.2.2 n46)

Book Ref

Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J: 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz' [CUP 1999], p.122


A Reaction

This may sound right for uncontroversial or well-defined abstracta such as numbers and circles, but even 'or' is ambiguous, and heaven knows what the transworld identity of 'democracy' is!


The 12 ideas from 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz'

We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]