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Single Idea 14078

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity ]

Full Idea

It is meaningless to talk of the same concrete thing in different possible worlds, ...but it makes sense to speak of the same individual concept, which is just a function which assigns to each possible world in a set an individual in that world.

Gist of Idea

Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds

Source

Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], VII)

Book Ref

-: 'Journal of Symbolic Logic' [-], p.208

A Reaction

A lovely bold response to the problem of transworld identity, but one which needs investigation. It sounds very promising to me. 'Aristotle' is a cocept, not a name. There is no separate category of 'names'. Wow. (Attach dispositions to concepts?).

The 14 ideas from Allan Gibbard

14064 If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
14066 A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
14067 Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
14065 Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
14070 A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
14069 We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
14071 Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
14072 Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
14073 Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
14074 Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
14076 Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
14077 Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
14078 Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
14079 Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]