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Full Idea
Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds quite naturally.
Gist of Idea
Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds
Source
Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.4)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.16
A Reaction
A definite description can pick out the same object in another possible world, or a very similar one, or an object which has almost nothing in common with the others.
| 11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
| 11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
| 15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
| 15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
| 15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
| 15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
| 15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |