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Full Idea
It is not a good idea to think of possible worlds as sets of propositions, and at the same time to think of propositions as sets of possible worlds.
Gist of Idea
You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds
Source
Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I n3)
Book Ref
Salmon,Nathan: 'Metaphysics, Mathematics and Meaning' [OUP 2005], p.131
A Reaction
Salmon favours thinking of worlds as sets of propositions, and hence rejects the account of propositions as sets of worlds. He favours the 'Russellian' view of propositions, which seem to me to be the same as 'facts'.
| 7690 | If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis] |
| 14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
| 15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan] |
| 7695 | Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette] |
| 7694 | We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette] |
| 10981 | A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read] |
| 19011 | If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter] |