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Full Idea
If a 'world' is understood as a set of sentences, then possibility may be understood as consistency, ...but this seems circular, in that 'consistency' of sentences cannot adequately be defined save in terms of possibility.
Gist of Idea
If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility
Source
William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09)
Book Ref
'The Possible and the Actual', ed/tr. Loux,Michael J. [Cornell 1979], p.302
A Reaction
[Carnap and Hintikka propose the view, Lewis 'Counterfactuals' p.85 objects] Worlds as sentences is not, of course, the same as worlds as propositions. There is a lot of circularity around in 'possible' worlds.
| 7690 | If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis] |
| 14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
| 15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan] |
| 7695 | Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette] |
| 7694 | We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette] |
| 10981 | A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read] |
| 19011 | If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter] |