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Full Idea
Conventional modal semantics, in which all logically possible worlds are defined in terms of maximally consistent proposition sets, has no choice except to allow that the actual world is the world we experience in sensation, or that we inhabit.
Gist of Idea
We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions
Source
Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Ch. 9)
Book Ref
Jacquette,Dale: 'Ontology' [Acumen 2002], p.79
A Reaction
Jacquette dislikes this because he is seeking an account of ontology that doesn't, as so often, merely reduce to epistemology (e.g. Berkeley). See Idea 7691 for his preferred account.
Related Idea
Idea 7691 The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette]
| 7690 | If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis] |
| 14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
| 15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan] |
| 7695 | Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette] |
| 7694 | We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette] |
| 10981 | A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read] |
| 19011 | If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter] |