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Single Idea 13968

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds ]

Full Idea

For the Kripkean possible states of the world are not alternate concrete universes, but abstract objects. Metaphysically possible world-states are maximally complete ways the real concrete universe could have been.

Gist of Idea

Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been

Source

Scott Soames (Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori [2006], p.167)

Book Ref

Soames,Scott: 'Philosophical Essays 2:Significance of Language' [Princeton 2009], p.167


A Reaction

This is probably clearer about the Kripkean view than Kripke ever is, but then that is part of Soames's mission. It sounds like the right way to conceive possible worlds. At least there is some commitment there, rather than instrumentalism about them.


The 17 ideas from Scott Soames

Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames]
Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames]
Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames]
Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames]
If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames]
Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames]