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Single Idea 16445

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds ]

Full Idea

I prefer to think of the possible worlds not as points in logical space but as cells of a relatively fine-grained partition of logical space - a partition that makes all the distinctions we need.

Gist of Idea

I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space

Source

Robert C. Stalnaker (Mere Possibilities [2012], 1.2)

Book Ref

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Mere Possibilities' [Princeton 2012], p.13

A Reaction

Since he regards possible worlds as simply a means of regimenting our understanding of modality, he can think of possible worlds in any way that suits him. I find it hard work tuning in to his vision.

Related Idea

Idea 16444 Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker]

The 27 ideas from 'Mere Possibilities'

16433 Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker]
16434 Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker]
16436 Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker]
16437 Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker]
16439 A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker]
16438 Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker]
16440 I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker]
16443 Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker]
16444 Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker]
16445 I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker]
16442 I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker]
16447 A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker]
16446 Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
16448 Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker]
16449 In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker]
16450 Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker]
16452 Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker]
16453 The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker]
16454 Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker]
16461 We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker]
16464 We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker]
16465 In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker]
16467 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker]
16466 Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker]
16468 Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker]
16471 I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker]
16474 How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker]