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Single Idea 18872

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds ]

Full Idea

I think we should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds.

Gist of Idea

We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds

Source

Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec')

Book Ref

'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.110

A Reaction

An interesting passing remark. Presumably there would be unknowable truths about such worlds, which wouldn't bother a full-blooded realist. Indiscernible to whom? Me? Humanity? A divine mind?

The 31 ideas from Ross P. Cameron

15401 Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron]
15393 An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron]
15396 Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron]
15394 Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron]
15395 Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron]
15102 S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron]
15103 Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron]
15104 The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron]
18881 For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron]
18879 What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
18880 Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
18867 Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron]
18873 God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron]
18868 Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron]
18870 Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron]
18871 I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron]
18869 Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron]
18872 We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron]
18875 Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron]
18878 Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron]
18877 Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron]
18874 Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
18923 The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
18924 Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron]
18930 Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron]
18927 Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron]
18926 One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
18929 We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
18928 If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
18932 The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
18931 Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]