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Single Idea 16799

[filed under theme 14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration ]

Full Idea

Inductive inference is a matter of weighing evidence and judging probability, not of proof.

Gist of Idea

Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability

Source

Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Underd')

Book Ref

Lipton,Peter: 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd ed)' [Routledge 2004], p.5

A Reaction

This sounds like a plausible fallibilist response to the optimistic view of Aristotle.

The 56 ideas from Peter Lipton

16801 A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton]
16802 Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton]
16803 Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton]
16804 Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton]
16799 Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton]
16800 An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton]
16809 Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton]
16807 An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton]
16808 An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton]
16812 An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton]
16811 An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton]
16810 Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton]
16806 An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton]
16813 To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton]
16815 Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton]
16816 In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton]
16814 Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes [Lipton]
16823 Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton]
16822 Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton]
16824 Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton]
16817 Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton]
16818 The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton]
16820 Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton]
16819 IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton]
16821 Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton]
16825 How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton]
16826 With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton]
16827 If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton]
16829 We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton]
16828 IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton]
16832 If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton]
16836 My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton]
16831 A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton]
16833 We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton]
16834 To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton]
16840 To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton]
16837 Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton]
16839 Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton]
16838 Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton]
16847 Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton]
16846 A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton]
16849 Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton]
16848 Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton]
16844 A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton]
16841 Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton]
16842 We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton]
16854 Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other [Lipton]
16855 The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton]
16853 We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton]
16852 Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton]
16851 The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton]
16850 Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton]
16856 It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton]
16857 Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton]
16858 We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton]
16798 We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton]