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Single Idea 16799

[filed under theme 14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration ]

Full Idea

Inductive inference is a matter of weighing evidence and judging probability, not of proof.

Gist of Idea

Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability

Source

Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Underd')

Book Ref

Lipton,Peter: 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd ed)' [Routledge 2004], p.5


A Reaction

This sounds like a plausible fallibilist response to the optimistic view of Aristotle.


The 27 ideas with the same theme [proving physical facts by observation and reason]:

Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle]
Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle]
There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths [Aristotle]
Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type [Aristotle]
Demonstration is more than entailment, as the explanatory order must match the causal order [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Aristotle doesn't actually apply his theory of demonstration to his practical science [Leroi on Aristotle]
We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding [Aristotle]
Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions [Aristotle]
A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities [Aristotle]
Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself [Aristotle]
Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term [Aristotle]
All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties [Aristotle]
Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations [Aristotle]
Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions [Aristotle]
Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar [Aristotle]
The principles of demonstrations are definitions [Aristotle]
There must be definitions before demonstration is possible [Aristotle]
Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes [Aristotle]
Demonstration derives what is less clear from what is clear [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce]
Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton]
We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton]
Demonstration provides depth of understanding and explanation (rather than foundations) [Kretzmann/Stump]
In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki]
In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki]