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Single Idea 2396

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction ]

Full Idea

Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation.

Gist of Idea

Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation

Source

David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 1.2.2)

Book Ref

Chalmers,David J.: 'The Conscious Mind' [OUP 1997], p.43

The 57 ideas from David J.Chalmers

16473 Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths [Chalmers, by Stalnaker]
19258 Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world [Chalmers, by Vaidya]
14708 Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter]
9318 Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford]
2386 Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers]
2390 We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers]
2389 Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers]
2391 Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers]
2392 Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers]
2393 Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
2394 Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
2395 Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers]
2396 Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers]
2397 'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers]
2398 Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers]
13956 Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers]
13963 Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers]
13960 In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers]
13962 Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers]
13958 The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]
2399 Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers]
13959 The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]
13957 Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers]
13961 We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers]
18403 Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers]
2400 Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers]
2401 All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers]
16048 Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K]
2402 It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers]
2403 Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers]
2404 Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers]
2406 H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers]
2405 Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers]
2407 One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers]
16426 How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers]
16425 Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers]
16424 Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers]
16427 Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers]
2409 Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers]
2411 Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers]
2413 If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers]
2412 Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers]
2414 When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers]
2415 In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers]
2416 What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers]
2417 Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers]
2418 The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers]
2419 Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers]
2422 The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers]
2423 Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers]
2424 It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers]
2426 Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers]
2428 Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers]
2429 Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers]
14712 A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers]
14713 Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers]
14739 'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds [Chalmers, by Sider]