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Full Idea
If the alleged necessity, e,g, 2+2=4, really does depend upon a convention governing the use of the words in which we state it, and the existence of that convention is merely a contingent matter, then it can't after all be necessary.
Gist of Idea
If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity
Source
Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], p.302)
Book Ref
-: 'Philosophical Perspectives' [-], p.302
A Reaction
[Hale is citing Blackburn for this claim] Hale suggests replies, by keeping truth and meaning separate, and involving laws of logic. Blackburn clearly has a good point.
| 12432 | Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale] |
| 12433 | If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale] |
| 12434 | Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale] |
| 12435 | The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale] |
| 12436 | Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale] |