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Single Idea 15031

[filed under theme 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity ]

Full Idea

English modals are context-dependent through and through; there is no stable 'outer modality'.

Gist of Idea

Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language

Source

Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.7)

Book Ref

Sider,Theodore: 'Writing the Book of the World' [OUP 2011], p.281


A Reaction

Sider has been doing so well up to here. To me this is swallowing the bait of linguistic approaches to philosophy which he has fought so hard to avoid.


The 49 ideas from 'Writing the Book of the World'

Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider]
A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider]
There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider]
Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider]
If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider]
Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider]
Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider]
The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider]
Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider]
A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider]
Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider]
Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider]
Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider]
Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider]
We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider]
Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider]
Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider]
Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider]
'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider]
'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider]
Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider]
Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider]
'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider]
Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider]
It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider]
Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider]
We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider]
Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider]
Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider]
If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider]
Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider]
Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider]
Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider]
It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider]
Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider]
Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider]
Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider]
The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider]
The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider]
The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider]
The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider]
Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider]
If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider]
Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider]
Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider]
Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider]
Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider]
Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider]
Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider]