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Single Idea 12071

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism ]

Full Idea

An essence is not a property (or a cluster of properties) of the substance whose essence it is, ...because no property (no Aristotelian property) can be the cause of being of an actual individual substance.

Gist of Idea

Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances)

Source

report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle Intro

Book Ref

Witt,Charlotte: 'Substance and Essence in Aristotle' [Cornell 1994], p.3


A Reaction

This is the third of Witt's three unorthodox theses, mainly in defence of individual essences in Aristotle. The first two seem to me to be correct, and the third one is interesting. I'm inclined to think that essences are powers, found below properties.


The 30 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about form specifying matter]:

Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle]
Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle]
In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological [Aristotle, by Wedin]
The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being [Aristotle]
In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Aristotle, by Witt]
Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees [Aristotle, by Politis]
Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing [Aristotle, by Kung]
Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential [Aristotle]
The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Substantial forms must exist, to explain the stability of metals like silver and tin [Albertus Magnus]
Hot water naturally cools down, which is due to the substantial form of the water [William of Ockham]
Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez]
Prime matter is free of all forms, but has the potential for all forms [Eustachius]
A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes]
Form is not a separate substance, but just the manner, modification or 'stamp' of matter [Boyle]
To cite a substantial form tells us what produced the effect, but not how it did it [Boyle]
Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
If the substantial form of brass implies its stability, how can it melt and remain brass? [Alexander,P]
Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody]
Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock [Wedin]
The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity [Koslicki]
The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami]
Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau]