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Single Idea 17043

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism ]

Full Idea

Form is a more plausible candidate for being nature than matter is because we speak of a thing as what it actually is at the time, rather than what it then is potentially.

Gist of Idea

Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential

Source

Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 193b07)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Physics', ed/tr. Waterfield,Robin [OUP 1996], p.35

A Reaction

Note that matter remains potential, even when it is part of an actual thing. This seems to be the obvious point that a statue isn't potentially anything else, but its clay is potentially other objects. Does Aristotle think clay is thereby less real?

The 94 ideas from 'Physics'

22929 Aristotle's infinity is a property of the counting process, that it has no natural limit [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
22930 Lengths do not contain infinite parts; parts are created by acts of division [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
11255 In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Aristotle, by Politis]
16972 The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
11254 Matter is potentiality [Aristotle, by Politis]
11250 Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end [Aristotle, by Politis]
12045 Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature [Aristotle, by Annas]
17464 When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate? [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry on Aristotle]
11252 The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing [Aristotle, by Politis]
11253 A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source [Aristotle, by Politis]
22885 For Aristotle time is not a process but a means for measuring processes [Aristotle, by Bardon]
5080 We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements [Aristotle]
9071 We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it [Aristotle]
13270 Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause? [Aristotle]
16644 The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects [Aristotle]
5082 Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars [Aristotle]
16104 Unity of the form is just unity of the definition [Aristotle]
16172 Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it [Aristotle]
16173 Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration [Aristotle]
16174 A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape [Aristotle]
16623 We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed [Aristotle]
5083 Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical. [Aristotle]
16574 Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence [Aristotle]
16762 Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty [Aristotle]
17041 Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements [Aristotle]
17042 Natural things are their own source of stability through change [Aristotle]
5084 A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability [Aristotle]
17043 Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential [Aristotle]
9787 Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study [Aristotle]
9788 Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error [Aristotle]
9789 You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together [Aristotle]
9790 Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature [Aristotle]
5085 'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter [Aristotle]
5086 The nature of a thing is its end and purpose [Aristotle]
5087 A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends [Aristotle]
8331 To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause [Aristotle]
8332 The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end [Aristotle]
20042 We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle]
13106 Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings [Aristotle]
13107 Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally [Aristotle]
13108 Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice [Aristotle]
13109 Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually [Aristotle]
13110 Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary [Aristotle]
16968 There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question [Aristotle]
16969 Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose [Aristotle]
16970 A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too [Aristotle]
17262 Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding [Aristotle, by Correia/Schnieder]
5089 Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains? [Aristotle]
5091 Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose [Aristotle]
5092 Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first [Aristotle]
5093 Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible [Aristotle]
16115 Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially [Aristotle]
20063 Motion fulfils potentiality [Aristotle]
16656 The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here [Aristotle]
5095 The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end [Aristotle]
16691 A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring [Aristotle]
18090 Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end [Aristotle]
5097 If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place [Aristotle]
16791 There is no whole except for the parts [Aristotle]
5098 Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body [Aristotle]
5099 The universe as a whole is not anywhere [Aristotle]
22956 How can time exist, when it is composed of what has ceased to be and is yet to be? [Aristotle]
5102 If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist [Aristotle]
16693 Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows [Aristotle]
22957 We can't tell whether the changing present moment is one thing, or a succession of things [Aristotle]
22958 Nows can't be linked together, any more than points on a line [Aristotle]
22916 Unlike time, change goes at different rates, and is usually localised [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
5103 Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed [Aristotle]
20920 If there were many cosmoses, each would have its own time, giving many times [Aristotle]
8590 Time does not exist without change [Aristotle]
5104 Time is an aspect of change [Aristotle]
22959 Time is not change, but the number we associate with change [Aristotle]
22960 The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace [Aristotle]
22961 The present moment is obviously a necessary feature of time [Aristotle]
22962 Two is the least number, but there is no least magnitude, because it is always divisible [Aristotle]
22963 We measure change by time, and time by change, as they are interdefined [Aristotle]
22964 Change only exists in time through its being temporally measure [Aristotle]
22965 Time measures rest, as well as change [Aristotle]
5105 The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time [Aristotle]
22966 The present moment is a link (of past to future), and also a limit (of past and of future) [Aristotle]
5106 Would there be time if there were no mind? [Aristotle]
22967 It is unclear whether time depends on the existence of soul [Aristotle]
22968 Circular motion is the most obvious measure of time, and especially the celestial sphere [Aristotle]
9974 Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten [Aristotle]
5107 Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection [Aristotle]
5108 Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise? [Aristotle]
18833 A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points [Aristotle]
5110 Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature [Aristotle]
5111 All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain [Aristotle]
5113 Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order [Aristotle]
5114 If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe? [Aristotle]
5116 When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious [Aristotle]
5117 Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up [Aristotle]
5119 The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude [Aristotle]