more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 17043

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism ]

Full Idea

Form is a more plausible candidate for being nature than matter is because we speak of a thing as what it actually is at the time, rather than what it then is potentially.

Gist of Idea

Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential

Source

Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 193b07)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Physics', ed/tr. Waterfield,Robin [OUP 1996], p.35

A Reaction

Note that matter remains potential, even when it is part of an actual thing. This seems to be the obvious point that a statue isn't potentially anything else, but its clay is potentially other objects. Does Aristotle think clay is thereby less real?

The 30 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about form specifying matter]:

24040 Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle]
24055 Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle]
12345 In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological [Aristotle, by Wedin]
11285 The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being [Aristotle]
16147 In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
12071 Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Aristotle, by Witt]
11251 Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees [Aristotle, by Politis]
12084 Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Aristotle, by Witt]
16119 Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
16148 Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
16112 A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
12002 Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing [Aristotle, by Kung]
16164 Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
17043 Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential [Aristotle]
13276 The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
16756 Substantial forms must exist, to explain the stability of metals like silver and tin [Albertus Magnus]
16757 Hot water naturally cools down, which is due to the substantial form of the water [William of Ockham]
17007 Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez]
16585 Prime matter is free of all forms, but has the potential for all forms [Eustachius]
16620 A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes]
16034 Form is not a separate substance, but just the manner, modification or 'stamp' of matter [Boyle]
15953 To cite a substantial form tells us what produced the effect, but not how it did it [Boyle]
11181 Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
11184 Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
15959 If the substantial form of brass implies its stability, how can it melt and remain brass? [Alexander,P]
12140 Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody]
12346 Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock [Wedin]
24066 The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity [Koslicki]
10938 The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami]
16602 Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau]