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Single Idea 17022

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations ]

Full Idea

No more causes of natural things should be admitted than are both true and sufficient to explain the phenomena. …For nature does nothing in vain, …and nature is simple and does not indulge in the luxury of superfluous causes.

Gist of Idea

We should admit only enough causes to explain a phenomenon, and no more

Source

Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Bk 3 Rule 1)

Book Ref

Newton,Isaac: 'Philosophical Writings' [CUP 2004], p.87


A Reaction

This emphasises that Ockham's Razor is a rule for physical explanation, and not just one for abstract theories. This is something like Van Fraassen's 'empirical adequacy'.


The 32 ideas with the same theme [explanation as showing the causes of events]:

Democritus was devoted to discovering causal explanations [Democritus, by Eusebius]
To investigate the causes of things, study what is best for them [Plato]
To grasp something, trace it back to its natural origins [Aristotle]
The foundation or source is stronger than the thing it causes [Aristotle]
Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus]
Science aims to show causes and generation of things [Hobbes]
We should admit only enough causes to explain a phenomenon, and no more [Newton]
Natural effects of the same kind should be assumed to have the same causes [Newton]
Minds are best explained by their ends, and bodies by efficient causes [Leibniz]
Causal inference is by spotting either Agreements or Differences [Mill, by Lipton]
If scientific explanation is causal, that rules out mathematical explanation [Smart]
Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon]
Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon]
Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos]
To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis]
An explanation tells us how an event was caused [Lewis]
Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories [Lewis]
The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben]
To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton]
Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton]
A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton]
Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton]
Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton]
Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford]
There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos]
An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos]
An explanation is a causal graph [Woodward,J, by Strevens]
Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger]
Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R]
Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty]
Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki]
There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P]