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Single Idea 12913

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation ]

Full Idea

One must always explain nature along mathematical and mechanical lines, provided one knows that the very principles or laws of mechanics or of force do not depend upon mathematical extension alone but upon certain metaphysical reasons.

Gist of Idea

Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14 X)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence', ed/tr. Mason,HT/Parkinson,GHR [Manchester UP 1967], p.66

A Reaction

I like this, and may even use it as the epigraph of my masterwork. Recently Stephen Hawking (physicist) has been denigrating philosophy, but I am with Leibniz on this one.

The 34 ideas with the same theme [picking out different styles of explanation]:

11246 Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds [Aristotle, by Politis]
11250 Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end [Aristotle, by Politis]
12045 Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature [Aristotle, by Annas]
16968 There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question [Aristotle]
16969 Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose [Aristotle]
3320 Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
13297 To the four causes Plato adds a fifth, the idea which guided the event [Seneca]
12913 Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics [Leibniz]
21917 The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
17897 Analytic explanation is wholes in terms of parts; synthetic is parts in terms of wholes or contexts [Belnap]
13050 The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon]
13059 Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon]
13064 The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon]
14366 An explanation is a table of statistical information [Salmon, by Strevens]
17672 A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong]
19061 An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett]
7459 Follow maths for necessary truths, and jurisprudence for contingent truths [Hacking]
16182 Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework [Cartwright,N]
17090 Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben]
18222 Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation [Field,H]
17271 Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K]
17291 We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K]
22926 In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin]
14319 Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford]
4812 Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos]
6750 Explanations are causal, nomic, psychological, psychoanalytic, Darwinian or functional [Bird]
20043 Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R]
17321 Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins]
17323 If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins]
17298 Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P]
17319 There are 'conceptual' explanations, with their direction depending on complexity [Schnieder]
19018 Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances [Vetter]
19020 Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics [Vetter]
23805 Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte]