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Full Idea
I see nothing metaphysically wrong in an infinite ontological regress of mechanisms and regularities.
Gist of Idea
There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities
Source
Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §5)
Book Ref
-: 'Philosophy of Science' [-], p.22
A Reaction
This is a pretty unusual view, and I can't accept it. My revulsion at this regress is precisely the reason why I believe in powers, as the bottom level of explanation.
| 16737 | The best explanations get down to primary basics, but others go less deep [Boyle] |
| 12737 | Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz] |
| 14873 | If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche] |
| 12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
| 3128 | It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere [Rey] |
| 15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
| 16564 | There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 14320 | Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford] |
| 14337 | Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford] |
| 14343 | To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford] |
| 15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
| 14389 | There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan] |