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Single Idea 9372

[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy ]

Full Idea

Could there be a fact of the matter about what each expression means, but no fact of the matter about whether they mean the same?

Gist of Idea

Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same?

Source

Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §II)

Book Ref

-: 'Nous' [-], p.8

A Reaction

He is discussing Quine's attack on synonymy, and his scepticism about meaning. Boghossian and I believe in propositions, so we have no trouble with two statements having the same meaning. Denial of propositions breeds trouble.

The 14 ideas from Paul Boghossian

17721 There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
9368 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]
9369 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
9367 The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
9372 Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
9375 Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
9376 A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
9373 That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
9380 We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
9374 If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
9377 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
9378 If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
9384 We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
6345 Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich]