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Single Idea 8518

[filed under theme 7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events ]

Full Idea

Events are widely acknowledged to be particulars, but they are plainly not ordinary concrete particulars. They are best viewed as trope-sequences, in which one condition gives way to another. They are changes in which tropes replace one another.

Gist of Idea

Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another

Source

Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §3)

Book Ref

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.129


A Reaction

If nothing exists except bundles of tropes, it is worth asking WHY one trope would replace another. Some tropes are active (i.e. they are best described as 'powers').


The 14 ideas from Keith Campbell

Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K]
Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K]
Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]
Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K]
Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K]
Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]