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Single Idea 13380

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects ]

Full Idea

When thought of just as an object, the parts of a thing seem definitive and their arrangement seems inconsequential. But when thought of as an object of a familiar kind it is reversed: the arrangement is important and the parts are inessential.

Gist of Idea

Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object

Source

Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.4)

Book Ref

Jubien,Michael: 'Possibility' [OUP 2009], p.15


A Reaction

This is analogous to the Ship of Theseus, where we say that the tour operator and the museum keeper give different accounts of whether it is the same ship. The 'kind' Jubien refers to is most likely to be a functional kind.


The 27 ideas with the same theme [what is involved in being part of something else]:

Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato]
The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole [Aristotle]
Indivisibles are not parts, but the extrema of parts [Leibniz]
Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts [Mill]
Class membership is not transitive, unlike being part of a part of the whole [Lesniewski, by George/Van Evra]
In the military, persons are parts of parts of large units, but not parts of those large units [Rescher]
I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen]
We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins]
Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien]
Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo]
A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts [Heil]
A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all [Heil]
Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region [Merricks]
We say 'b is part of a', 'b is a part of a', 'b are a part of a', or 'b are parts of a'. [Simons]
Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock]
Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins]
For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki]
The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki]
The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman]