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Single Idea 13268

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts ]

Full Idea

Lewis says that if not every class has a fusion then there must be a restriction on composition. The only plausible restrictions would be vague ones, which is impossible, because then whether composition occurs would be vague. So every class has a fusion.

Gist of Idea

There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague

Source

report of David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], p.212-3) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 9.1

Book Ref

Sider,Theodore: 'Four Dimensionalism' [OUP 2003], p.121

A Reaction

This is Lewis's key argument in favour of unrestricted composition, his Vagueness Argument. Why can't composition be vague? If you gradually reassemble a broken mirror, at what point does the mirror acquire its unity?

The 94 ideas from 'On the Plurality of Worlds'

10470 There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Lewis, by Oliver]
12255 For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis]
9219 Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider]
15022 If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis]
16441 Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker]
7690 If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis]
14404 The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks]
5441 Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis]
5440 A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner]
15399 The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron]
9650 Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion [Lewis]
16132 On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis]
16133 Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis]
9651 Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact [Lewis]
9652 To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis]
9658 An explanation tells us how an event was caused [Lewis]
15739 There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis]
10723 A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver]
9653 It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis]
15741 All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis]
15751 Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis]
15735 Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis]
9656 The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis]
15737 To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis]
15742 A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis]
15733 Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis]
15732 Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis]
15734 If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis]
9655 Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis]
14996 Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis]
15743 Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis]
15744 We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis]
9657 You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis]
15745 Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis]
15746 If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis]
15748 Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis]
15749 Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis]
15750 Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis]
15747 Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis]
9654 A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis]
15736 A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis]
15738 Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis]
15731 Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes') [Lewis]
15740 I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis]
15752 We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis]
9659 Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis]
10469 A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis]
8909 Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object [Lewis]
8901 Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively [Lewis]
8904 The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction [Lewis]
8938 The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers? [Lewis]
8903 Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets [Lewis]
8902 If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations [Lewis]
8906 If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes [Lewis]
8905 If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts [Lewis]
8908 For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction [Lewis]
8907 The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it [Lewis]
9660 The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis]
16278 A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis]
16279 General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis]
9661 Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed [Lewis]
16280 Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories [Lewis]
16274 If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising [Lewis]
16281 Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense [Lewis]
11903 Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Lewis, by Mackie,P]
13793 An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Lewis, by Elder]
16283 For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis]
16282 Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis]
16284 Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis]
16286 Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis]
16287 Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis]
9662 Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis]
16288 Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge) [Lewis]
16289 We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist [Lewis]
16290 I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis]
16291 In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis]
15968 Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis]
15969 Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis]
9664 Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis]
9665 There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis]
9663 A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis]
9666 It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything [Lewis]
9667 Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis]
9669 There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis]
15129 Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity [Lewis]
9670 Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg [Lewis]
9057 Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express [Lewis]
9671 Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision [Lewis]
19280 I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential [Lewis]
14737 Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
13268 There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider]
16262 Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin]
15397 If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
15398 Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]